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Abstract: The field of professional psychology has been tremendously successful, although it 
has also been characterized by many competing preparadigmatic theoretical orientations, which 
have led to a great deal of contention as well as conflicting views regarding psychological 
development, functioning, and behavior change. There is now widespread agreement regarding 
scientific explanations of many psychological processes, however, and, consequently, it is time 
to update the basic conceptual frameworks used for professional psychology education and 
practice. Replacing the traditional reliance on an array of theoretical orientations with a science-
based biopsychosocial framework would resolve many of the contradictions and conflicts that 
characterized the preparadigmatic era and would also provide a common perspective for 
unifying psychologists around a shared approach to practice, research, and training. 
   
Few would disagree that both the science and the practice of psychology have enjoyed 
phenomenal growth and success since their emergence just over a century ago and that the 
growth of professional psychology during the latter half of that period has been particularly 
impressive. As early as 1961, E. L. Kelly, the past president of American Psychological 
Association (APA) Division 12, noted that the growth of clinical psychology was “well nigh 
phenomenal. Before World War II, clinical psychologists were few in number, poorly paid, and 
had but little status…. Ours is a success story without counterpart in the history of professions” 
(p. 9). Since World War II, the number of licensed psychologists in the United States has grown 
from zero in 1945, when the first psychology licensure law was enacted, to close to 88,500 
today (Duffy et al., 2002). Much of the dramatic growth in membership in the APA, which went 
from 4,173 to over 90,000 during that same period, is also attributable to the large increase in 
the number of professional psychologists, from a minuscule number before World War II to 
approximately two thirds of the membership today (APA, 2005b). 
Given the youth, reach, and dramatic growth of psychology as a field, it was inevitable 
that the evolving discipline would experience significant tension and discord and that the 
science and practice areas in particular would come into conflict, given their differing needs and 
orientations. At times, the disagreement has been so strong that it is easy to forget that much of 
the success of professional psychology is directly dependent on the scientific credibility of 
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psychology as a discipline, and there is little doubt that the status of professional psychology 
would crumble if the scientific foundations of the field weakened. Indeed, it is reasonable to 
expect that the ability of professional psychology to continue to prosper is highly dependent on 
the extent to which the scientific foundations of the field continue to strengthen. 
It is also critical to acknowledge that a large part of the impressive growth of psychology 
as a scholarly discipline is attributable to the emergence of professional psychology and that 
psychological science has benefited enormously from the success of professional psychology 
(Sternberg, 2005). There are now a great many professional psychologists who work in a wide 
variety of settings, and the field has grown quite visible within health care systems, academia, 
government, and the public in general. We enjoy large student enrollments at both the 
undergraduate and the graduate levels, which is vital to our standing within universities. 
Research funding has grown substantially, and grants are usually awarded for attempts to solve 
practical problems associated with current mental health and social needs rather than for basic 
science per se (e.g., most of the funding provided by the National Institute of Mental Health 
goes to projects that have applied, clinical, or translational purposes; National Institute of Mental 
Health, 2006). 
Although the remarkable growth of psychology has presented many important 
opportunities, it has also posed significant challenges. In particular, our history has been heavily 
marked by internecine conflict between camps and schools. The competition and antagonism 
between the various camps and the “dogma eat dogma” (Larson, 1980, p. 19) environment that 
characterized much of our history might have subsided somewhat in recent years, but the deep 
divisions that became evident during the controversy surrounding recovered memories of child 
abuse and the ongoing contention between those espousing positivist and postmodern 
viewpoints suggest that the competition and divisions have not yet been resolved. Indeed, many 
leading psychologists have been concerned that the ongoing fragmentation of the field may 
affect our continued viability as a scholarly discipline (e.g., Gardner, 2005; Kendler, 2002; 
Rychlak, 2005; Sternberg, 2005; Driver-Linn, 2003, noted that “perceptions of psychology as 
beleaguered by fractionation and uncertainty are almost ubiquitous,” p. 270). 
Partly as an attempt to deal with these various conflicts and controversies, broad 
consensus has developed over the past several years that psychological practice needs to be 
based on research evidence regarding the effectiveness of our assessments and interventions 
(APA, 2005a). This tactic undoubtedly will prove useful for dealing with psychotherapeutic 
approaches that become controversial, and the reliability of the scientific evidence supporting 
particular approaches has become a primary focus of the debate in recent controversies 
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regarding novel therapy approaches (Chaffin et al., 2006; Herbert & Gaudiano, 2001; Perkins & 
Rouanzoin, 2002; Tsai, Morsbach, & Loftus, 2003). 
Although there may be growing consensus regarding the need for evidence-based 
practice, it is not yet clear which types of evidence and which criteria must be considered in 
evaluations of the effectiveness of particular professional practices. For example, as a field, we 
offer a remarkably wide variety of theoretical orientations for conceptualizing human 
development, psychopathology, and treatment. Indeed, over 400 different theoretical 
approaches have been developed (Corsini & Wedding, 2000). Of course, professional 
psychology training program faculty do not expect students to learn all of these approaches, but 
students are usually asked to learn about the most influential ones, which their theories of 
psychotherapy textbooks often cover chapter by chapter, starting with psychoanalysis and 
proceeding through humanistic, feminist, narrative, and other, more recent approaches. 
Students normally learn that these approaches are based on foundational assumptions or first 
principles that can take remarkably different and irreconcilable perspectives on human nature 
(e.g., fundamentally conflicted drives in Freudian theory, the blank slate of nearly complete 
malleability in behaviorism, an optimistic self-actualizing tendency in humanistic theories). 
These textbooks usually explain that several of these theoretical perspectives address only 
particular areas of human functioning or have received only limited research examination or 
inconsistent empirical support. 
To help compensate for some of these weaknesses, a variety of eclectic and integrative 
approaches have also been developed. These generally have also received little systematic 
empirical examination and are derived from a variety of theoretical starting points (e.g., theory is 
relatively unimportant in technical eclecticism, integrative approaches often combine two or 
more of the traditional approaches, and the common factors approach emphasizes still other 
processes). Students usually receive the message, either explicitly or implicitly, that they must 
choose one of these theoretical orientations so that their clinical work has structure and 
direction. Sometimes they make these choices through their decisions about which graduate 
program to attend and the orientations of the faculty at particular programs. At other times, they 
choose on the basis of what seems the best fit for them personally or the expectations of an 
academic advisor. 
Compared with other health care professions, this approach to learning the practice of 
psychology is certainly notable for the latitude allowed for choosing something as fundamental 
as the theoretical orientation, and consequently several of the particular skills, with which to 
practice the profession. This approach nonetheless seems to be consistent with the actual 
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practice of psychologists. For example, surveys consistently find wide variation in the theoretical 
orientations of licensed psychologists and other therapists, with substantial numbers endorsing 
orientations that fundamentally conflict with others. In fact, these surveys usually find that the 
largest number of adherents to any one particular orientation, even if it is one of several forms of 
an eclectic or integrative approach, still remains a minority, usually less than one third of the 
sample (Norcross, 2005). In addition, although there appears to be growing agreement that the 
field needs to move in the direction of training and assessing the competencies that its students 
and new practitioners should possess rather than having them merely complete a core 
curriculum, there seems to be remarkably little agreement about what psychologists should 
actually be competent to do at anything more than a very general level, such as the ability to do 
assessment and intervention, but with almost no specificity as to what assessment or 
intervention actually entails (Kaslow et al., 2004). 
These various sources of evidence clearly suggest that professional psychology lacks a 
shared, common, and systematic approach for conceptualizing our clinical work and, 
consequently, for preparing students for entry into the profession. The existence of numerous 
and diverging theoretical orientations also raises questions about the nature of the scientific 
foundations of the field. When a field lacks a common language and framework for 
understanding the subject matter involved, it becomes evident that the field may not be based 
on a particular body of scientific knowledge and associated skills that students and new 
practitioners are expected to master. Is it then possible that there exist multiple, relatively 
independent bodies of scientific literature that support a variety of different theoretical 
orientations for practicing the profession? This article addresses these questions and presents 
the argument that psychological science has advanced to the point where a unified, science-
based conceptual framework for professional practice should replace the multifarious 
assortment of theoretical orientations that have dominated professional psychology throughout 
our history. 
This article proceeds by briefly reviewing the preparadigmatic nature of young sciences 
before discussing the current scientific status of psychology. It is then argued that a current 
scientific perspective on human development, functioning, and behavior change conflicts with 
many of the traditional viewpoints that we still often use for conceptualizing our clinical work as 
well as our educational programming for preparing future psychologists. Then four propositions 
are offered for establishing a conceptual framework for the practice of psychology that 
accommodate and integrate the well-established scientific findings regarding the full range of 
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biological, psychological, and sociocultural influences on human development and functioning 
as well as the full range of evidence-based practices that psychologists currently use. 
 
The Nature of Science and the Scientific Evolution of Psychology 
To understand why professional psychology as well as psychology in general have been 
characterized by many disconnected and often conflicting approaches to understanding human 
behavior, it is necessary to remind ourselves about the evolution of scientific disciplines in 
general. Although a detailed analysis of these issues is well beyond the scope of this article, a 
brief review is necessary to understand the complicated pattern of development that psychology 
has followed. This complex history is familiar even to new students to psychology encountering 
their first courses on personality or psychotherapy. In these classes, they learn about the many 
highly varied and sometimes conflicting explanations for human behavior that have been offered 
over the years and the dependence of those explanations on first principles that often have 
simply been assumed rather than empirically examined and verified. Toulmin (1972), a 
philosopher of science, described the profusion of different conceptual frameworks in 
psychology as characteristic of a “would-be” rather than a real academic discipline:  
 
The characteristic features of would-be disciplines can best be illustrated… 
[when] we turn to professional psychologists [and other social scientists] for 
explanation of the behaviour of individual human beings… . We find a diversity of 
approaches of a kind unparalleled in physics… split into parties, factions, or sects, 
which have not managed to hammer out a common set of disciplinary goals… . 
And so the factional splitting will continue, justified less by agreed empirical 
demonstrations than by philosophical appeals to general methodological 
considerations. (pp. 382–383) 
 
The scientific foundations of psychology obviously have strengthened considerably since 
Toulmin (1972) offered this description. Nonetheless, the proliferation of theoretical approaches 
to psychotherapy has continued up to the present. Some recently developed approaches, such 
as those involving repressed memories of child abuse, eye movement desensitization and 
reprocessing, thought field therapy, and attachment therapy, quickly became controversial 
(Brown, Scheflin, & Hammond, 1998; Chaffin et al., 2006; Herbert & Gaudiano, 2001; Perkins & 
Rouanzoin, 2002). Many others, including several of the eclectic and integrative theoretical 
models that have been developed recently, have not yet become widely known or undergone 
thorough empirical examination (Kazdin, 1996; Norcross, 2005). 
It is important to note that this type of scientific development is not at all unprecedented. 
Indeed, young sciences normally are characterized by fragmentation and competition among 
6  Melchert 
 
theoretical orientations. For example, when describing the early history of the physical sciences, 
Kuhn (1962) noted that during the first half of the 18th century  
 
there were almost as many views about the nature of electricity as there were 
important electrical experimenters… all were components of real scientific 
theories… . Yet though all the experiments were electrical and though most of the 
experimenters read each other's works, their theories had no more than a family 
resemblance. (pp. 13–14) 
 
Battles over the superiority and ownership of ideas were common and frequently fierce, 
involving scientific giants such as Galileo, Newton, Cavendish, Watt, Lavoisier, and many others 
(Merton, 1957).  
After a lengthy period that included many new, independent discoveries in physics, 
chemistry, and biology, the ongoing practice of science in those fields over the next decades 
and even centuries gradually began to uncover more and more relationships between 
phenomena that at first appeared unrelated. Sometimes scientists noticed that phenomena that 
intially had seemed completely unconnected were actually different in superficial ways that, in 
fact, obscured very important, deep relationships between those phenomena (e.g., at first 
between electrical and magnetic phenomena, later between electricity and chemistry, and still 
later among electricity, light, and magnetism; Shapere, 1977). 
As a young science, psychology over the past 120 years has also been characterized by 
the development of many independent and competing theories, often with relatively little 
communication among advocates of the various theories and little attempt to understand the 
relationships among the approaches. Indeed, the independence of several of these theoretical 
schools, with their own separate journals, conferences, professional organizations, and 
academic homes, has continued up to the present. There were some early attempts at 
identifying linkages among these approaches (French, 1933, and Rosenzweig, 1936, are 
notable), but these and other important integrative approaches (e.g., Dollard & Miller, 1950; 
Frank, 1961) did not stem the flow of new theoretical schools being developed. Eclectic and 
integrative approaches have become quite influential in the last 3 decades, and several have 
specifically focused on commonalities and areas of complementarity across theories (e.g., 
Messer, 1992; Prochaska & DiClemente, 1984; Wachtel, 1977). It is ironic, however, that we 
may now be experiencing a proliferation of integrative approaches, which could lead to the 
repetition of some of the competition and partisanship that gave rise to the integrative 
movement in the first place (Norcross, 2005). To gain a better understanding of why such a 
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variety of theoretical approaches developed, we need to more closely examine the role of 
scientific paradigms and the nature of the phenomena under study in psychology. 
There is substantial agreement among philosophers of science that a mature scientific 
discipline is characterized by the existence of paradigms that include widely accepted theories, 
supported by successful and compelling applications of those theories that are taught to 
students to prepare them for entry into that discipline (Kuhn, 1962; Lakatos, 1970; Laudon, 
1977). Many scholars (e.g., Kuhn, 1974; Toulmin, 1972) have pointed out that paradigms have 
been lacking throughout many of the social sciences, and certainly several areas within 
psychology have been characterized by multiple, competing views regarding the development of 
personality and psychopathology as well as methods for changing undesirable behaviors. These 
areas are characterized as being preparadigmatic. 
The research methods that are used to investigate questions at different stages of 
paradigmatic development also tend to vary. Eysenck (1984) noted that scientific inquiry often 
begins with hunches, acquired through careful observation and inductive reasoning processes. 
If the hunch seems reasonable after additional observation and analysis, scientists then specify 
hypotheses for which they seek verification, perhaps using a combination of correlational and 
experimental methods. If the verifications of these hypotheses are convincing, a theory might 
then be developed, and the focus of research at this point generally moves from description to 
explanation. It is also at this level that Popperian falsification (Popper, 1959) becomes important, 
with reliance on deductive reasoning and rigorous experimental procedures to examine 
questions involving mechanisms and causation. Eysenck (1960) described theories that are 
mainly the focus of verification to be weak, whereas strong theories are those primarily 
subjected to attempts at falsification. Experimental methods aimed at falsification must be used 
to demonstrate causation, and, consequently, paradigms cannot be achieved in fields that rely 
on correlational methods alone (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1969; Sokal & Sneath, 1963). If a theory 
survives sufficient attempts at falsification, it may even be elevated to the status of a scientific 
law. Kuhn (1962) observed that most of the time spent doing science involves the testing of 
deductions made within a particular paradigm, with minor improvements then being made to 
those paradigms as a result. During these periods of “normal science,” anomalies are often 
discovered. If those anomalies eventually can be accounted for by existing theories and laws, 
the paradigm is consequently strengthened. If they cannot, however, a scientific revolution 
occurs when it becomes obvious that a new theory is superior at explaining the relevant 
phenomena. 
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The wide variety of research methods currently in use in psychology reflects the rather 
amazing breadth of topics examined within the discipline as well as the wide range in which they 
fall in terms of paradigmatic development. In relatively new areas of research, descriptive 
methods are used to explore hunches about, for example, the influence of the interaction of 
ethnicity and gender on self-concept or the nature of the cognitive processing used by very 
highly skilled problem solvers. Several areas in psychophysiology, conversely, have long relied 
on disconfirmatory experimental methodologies. 
Fortunately, there are several fields in psychology that can be considered solidly 
paradigmatic (indeed, if this were not the case, the claim that professional psychology is a 
science-based profession would be highly questionable). The science of psychology is clearly 
much younger and less paradigmatic than the physical sciences, mainly because it is concerned 
with phenomena that are far more complex than physical phenomena—the noted biologist E. O. 
Wilson (1998), for example, observed that “by far the most complex systems known to exist in 
the universe are biological, and by far the most complex of all biological phenomena is the 
human mind” (p. 81). Naturally, then, it will take longer to reach paradigmatic consensus in 
psychology than it has in the physical sciences, although this is now happening in many areas. 
Several fields within the cognitive neurosciences (including psychophysiology) have a 
very firm scientific base. There is little disagreement regarding many of the biological substrates 
underlying the basic aspects of learning, memory, sensation, perception, and emotion 
(Fanselow & Poulos, 2005: Kandel, 2006; Thompson, 2005) or the behaviors controlled or 
mediated by particular brain structures (Friston, 2005; Lezak, 2004). Greater understanding of 
the biological maturation of the brain, in concert with the findings of developmental psychology, 
has resulted in a great deal that is now confidently known about the physical, cognitive, and 
social development of humans across the life span (Gottesman & Hanson, 2005; Kagan, 2003). 
The field of health psychology is vast, but there is wide agreement in many areas about the role 
of behavior in the course of and the treatments for many diseases (Boll, 2004). In the realm of 
personality, there is widespread consensus regarding the robustness of the Big Five personality 
traits (i.e., Extraversion, Neuroticism, Conscientiousness, Agreeableness, and Openness; 
McAdams & Pals, 2006). Likewise, there is reasonably strong reliability in the classification of 
many psychiatric diagnoses, although clearly the official nomenclatures remain at the syndromal 
level because of the lack of validating pathophysiological evidence (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2000). There is also general agreement regarding a significant genetic component 
to many psychiatric disorders, although their ultimate phenotypic manifestation is highly 
dependent on the experience of stressors and other environmental factors (Caspi et al., 2003; 
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Leonardo & Hen, 2006). There is little disagreement about the voluminous evidence supporting 
the effectiveness of psychotherapy (e.g., Lipsey & Wilson, 1993; Shadish, Navarro, Matt, & 
Phillips, 2000; Wampold, 2001), and the magnitude of effects for many psychological 
interventions has been shown to equal and sometimes exceed that of many medical and 
psychopharmacological interventions (Barlow, 2004; G. J. Meyer et al., 2001; Hollon, Stewart, & 
Strunk, 2006). We also know from fields such as sociology and anthropology as well as from 
psychology that sociocultural factors exert profound influences on psychological development 
and functioning, and these factors recently have become fully integrated into psychological 
models as well (e.g., APA, 2003, 2005a; Greenfield, Keller, Fuligni, & Maynard, 2003; McAdams 
& Pals, 2006; Norenzayan & Heine, 2005). 
At a very fundamental level, there also appears to be no argument that humans are 
inherently biopsychosocial (BPS) organisms in which the biological, psychological, and social 
dimensions are inextricably intertwined. Scientists might argue about the importance of 
particular biological, psychological, or sociocultural1 influences on human development and 
functioning across the life span, but since the publication of Engel's (1977) influential call for a 
BPS approach to health care in general, consensus has grown around this fundamental 
perspective (Eysenck, 1997; White, 2005). Although Engel referred to his approach as the 
“biopsychosocial model,” it is important to note that this perspective is not considered a model 
or a theory because it applies at a very general level and does not attempt to explain specific 
phenomena related to either physical or mental functioning (Malmgren, 2003; McLaren, 1998). 
Nonetheless, it does describe an essential and fundamental characteristic of human beings. It is 
also already very widely accepted, having been established as the foundational perspective for 
the field of health psychology (Suls & Rothman, 2004); incorporated into the curricula in nearly 
all medical schools in the United States and Europe (Frankel, Quill, & McDaniel, 2003); and 
officially endorsed by the APA, American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, American 
Nurses Association, National Association of Social Workers, and 22 other health care and social 
service professional organizations (APA, 2006a). Although other comprehensive, integrative 
perspectives on human development and functioning have been developed, none enjoys the 
widespread recognition and acceptance the BPS approach does. 
Scientific progress obviously will continue in many areas of psychology, and advances in 
some areas, such as the cognitive neurosciences, are occurring at a breathtaking pace. In just a 
few years, perhaps several current hypotheses will move on to become weak theories, and 
some theories will progress from the weak to the strong category. As we move forward, it is 
important to acknowledge that biologically oriented research will play an increasingly helpful role 
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in providing a unifying perspective for psychology, in particular in terms of the neurosciences 
and evolutionary theory (Wilson, 1998). Obviously, all of our behavior is dependent on the 
underlying physiological functioning of the nervous system. As the neurosciences provide more 
detailed explanations of the neural substrates of cognitive, affective, and behavioral processes, 
greater familiarity with the physical functioning of the brain will become critical for a complete 
understanding of psychological development and functioning. An evolutionary perspective is 
also growing in importance for understanding human behavior. As Buss (1991) explained,  
 
at some fundamental level of description, evolution by natural selection is the 
process that creates physiological, anatomical, and psychological mechanisms. 
Therefore the crucial question is not whether evolution is relevant to the 
understanding of human behavior but how it is relevant. (p. 461) 
 
Adaptation has been described as the central concept for understanding biological 
development as well as behavioral function at the level of the species, of populations, and of 
individuals (Holland, 1975; Turkheimer, 1998). Through the ongoing process of adaptation, 
human beings have evolved with physiological, anatomical, and psychological characteristics 
that constrain behavior across all the biological, psychological, and sociocultural domains. As 
several of our traditional psychological theories were founded on assumed first principles about 
human nature, perhaps explanations of future theories will begin with an evolutionary 
perspective and a review of the relevant neuroscience findings. 
The increasing importance of a biological perspective certainly does not mean that 
psychology will eventually become a specialty area within biology, just as biology did not 
become a subfield of chemistry despite how strictly biological processes obey the laws of 
chemistry and physics. Nor did medicine become a subfield of biology, even though discoveries 
in microbiology propelled the remarkable advance of allopathic medicine in recent decades. Our 
genetically inherited evolutionary history obviously constrains our development and behavior in 
many important ways, but it does not determine our behavior or development, because nearly 
all psychological outcomes are multifactorially determined, with genetic components interacting 
so closely with environmental factors that the traditional nature–nurture distinctions are of little 
value in understanding these processes (i.e., the brain is remarkably plastic and is constantly 
changing in response to experience; Fanselow & Poulos, 2005; Gottesman & Hanson, 2005). 
This brief review of the scientific status of psychology is not meant to provide an 
assessment of the strength of research findings across the various subfields within the discipline. 
Instead, enough examples of well-accepted scientific findings in psychology are presented so 
that it is clear that many areas within the field have attained paradigmatic status. The critical 
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implication of having reached this point is that we now need to consider replacing the 
preparadigmatic array of theoretical orientations that have dominated much of our history with a 
new framework based on current scientific evidence. The need to take this next step becomes 
clearer when we take a closer look at the theoretical orientations that professional psychologists 
have often used for conceptualizing their clinical work. 
 
Practitioners' Theoretical Orientations   
Students, educators, and practitioners in professional psychology have grown very used 
to being asked to identify the theoretical orientation that guides their clinical work. For example, 
one of the five required essay questions on the standard Association of Psychology 
Postdoctoral and Internship Centers internship application form asks applicants to “describe 
your theoretical orientation and describe how this influences your approach to case 
conceptualization and intervention” (Association of Psychology Postdoctoral and Internship 
Centers, 2005). The standards for APA accreditation require programs to describe the 
theoretical perspectives held by the core faculty (Committee on Accreditation, 2005). Insurance 
providers commonly ask therapists to indicate the theoretical orientation that they ascribe to 
when they apply to join provider panels, and these are often then advertised to potential clients 
who are looking for a therapist. At least 36 survey studies have been published that have 
explored the theoretical orientations endorsed by different types of psychotherapists (Jensen, 
Bergin, & Greaves, 1990; Norcross, 2005). 
The results of these surveys are widely known. One of the notable results involves the 
emergence of eclectic and integrative orientations to practice as the most popular approach to 
guide the professional work of therapists in the last few decades (Norcross, 2005). It is also well 
known that part of the reason that various psychologists developed eclectic or integrative 
approaches was the rampant proliferation of schools of therapy during the last half century. A 
remarkable number of approaches, in excess of 400, have been developed (Corsini & Wedding, 
2000). Many of these did not receive systematic empirical examination, and many were not 
endorsed, sometimes not even known, by any sizable number of researchers within the field. As 
a group, these various theoretical schools described the development of personality and 
psychopathology and the process of behavior change in a wide variety of ways, which often 
conflicted with each other, and it is widely known that a number of these theoretical orientations 
have not fared well in terms of scientific scrutiny. Of course, many psychologists were correct in 
concluding that this situation was not defensible (e.g., Beutler, 1983; Norcross, 1986). In 
response, a variety of eclectic and integrative approaches were developed that have been 
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categorized into approaches focused on technical eclecticism, theoretical integration, common 
factors, or assimilative integration (Norcross, 2005). These approaches solved some of the 
obvious problems associated with the proliferation of individual theoretical orientations, but 
problems remain. The approaches also diverge, sometimes widely, in their theoretical 
perspectives (e.g., eclecticism vs. theoretical integration vs. common factors), rigorous empirical 
examination of these approaches has been limited to date, and there has been some 
proliferation of eclectic and integrative approaches, which then raises questions about their 
adequacy as a whole (Fishman & Messer, 2005; Kazdin, 1996; Norcross, 2005). 
The limitations of these varied theoretical approaches are understandable given the 
limited explanations for many mental health issues that have been available until recently. 
Reliable scientific evidence regarding human psychology has grown quite dramatically over the 
past couple of decades, however, and, consequently, we may have left the era when individual 
practitioners could base their clinical case conceptualizations on personal preferences for 
theoretical orientations. Since the 1990s and the wave of malpractice suits involving repressed 
memories of child sexual abuse along with the widely publicized client death in the Colorado 
attachment therapy case, there is now widespread agreement in the mental health care field as 
well as the legal system that psychological practice must be based on reliable scientific 
evidence that is appropriately applied to the case at hand—indeed, this is now the official policy 
of the APA (APA, 2005a). 
 
A Unified Science-Based Approach to Professional Psychology   
Psychological science has advanced to the point where an integrative conceptual 
framework squarely based on scientific evidence can now replace the traditional assortment of 
theoretical orientations that characterized the preparadigmatic era within the field. Human 
development and functioning are incredibly complex (involving the most complex phenomena 
known to exist), but it is possible to integrate the paradigmatic scientific findings regarding 
psychology now available through a general but comprehensive conceptual framework. When 
this is done, I believe we will arrive at at least four basic propositions that would unify the 
practice of psychology around a shared, common, and scientifically current perspective. 
1. Human beings are inherently BPS organisms, and, consequently, psychological 
practice must be based on an integrative approach to understanding all three of these 
dimensions. This perspective has a long history, having been introduced into the psychiatry 
curriculum at Johns Hopkins University almost a century ago (A. Meyer, 1917). More recently, 
Engel (1977) has been the most influential advocate for the view that humans are inherently 
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BPS organisms in whom biological, psychological, and social influences on development and 
functioning are all very influential and, at the same time, inextricably intertwined. Because the 
BPS perspective is based on one of the most fundamental observations regarding human 
functioning, it provides an appropriate, useful, and in some ways necessary foundation for 
conceptualizing the practice of psychology. For example, conceptualizations of the development 
of personality characteristics, psychopathology, or intelligence obviously fall far short when the 
influence of culture is not incorporated or biological considerations are ignored. This conclusion 
would be readily evident to child, medical, family, and geropsychologists, who are routinely 
faced with the interplay of the biological, psychological, and sociocultural dimensions of their 
clients' lives in very immediate and direct ways. 
2. Psychological assessment procedures must reflect the fundamental BPS nature of 
human psychology. This proposition actually appears to be well supported by current practices 
in psychology. For example, a review of popular textbooks for teaching psychological 
assessment in clinical, counseling, and school psychology finds a high degree of convergence 
on this point. Whether they are discussing children, adolescents, adults, or seniors, our 
textbooks are consistent in noting that a variety of biological, psychological, and sociocultural 
factors must be evaluated and then integrated in formulation of case conceptualizations. It 
appears that there is a high level of agreement even about many of the details involved, such 
that one could select almost any one of the popular texts and find guidelines that are generally 
consistent with the others. Support for this perspective also comes from our ethical guidelines, 
our licensure exams, and the standards of practice identified by malpractice courts and 
disciplinary bodies. The Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations 
(2006) behavioral health care standards require that a similar range of domains be assessed, 
and the practice guidelines published by the American Psychiatric Association (2004) are also 
consistent with this approach. This convergence of expert opinion reflects the paradigmatic 
status of the BPS perspective in the field. 
An important implication that follows from the necessity of taking a comprehensive, 
integrative, BPS approach to psychological assessment is that relatively little room is allowed for 
using personal theoretical orientations when one is conducting these assessments. Information 
must be collected regarding all the BPS domains and integrated in a rational manner supported 
by scientific evidence. Certainly, there will be significant variability across practitioners in the 
information obtained and how it is integrated, but this should occur within reasonable limits. The 
task of specifying the reasonable limits within which these procedures should be carried out has 
not yet received a great deal of attention in professional psychology, but medicine has tackled 
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these issues repeatedly over the last century (starting with the Flexner Report in 1910; Sharpe 
& Faden, 1998), and industrial and organizational psychology has a great deal of experience 
with similar issues in terms of job analysis and competency modeling (Shippmann et al., 2000). 
Research findings also cannot yet reliably portion out the variance in many psychosocial 
outcomes that is attributable to specific BPS influences and their interactions (this is certainly 
true of medical outcomes as well). Consequently, it is necessary to integrate a great deal of 
clinical expertise into this process. Nonetheless, our standard guidelines for practice, as they 
currently exist, require an integrative assessment of all of these domains, and our diagnoses, 
other assessment findings, and treatment recommendations must follow rationally from a 
consideration of all of them. One's theoretical preferences do not override these basic 
requirements. 
3. Current evidence suggests more latitude in the process of treatment planning and 
intervention than in assessment, although they, too, must be based on a BPS approach. 
Whereas there is broad agreement that psychological assessment must be conducted in a fairly 
systematic, comprehensive, and integrative BPS manner, currently available evidence suggests 
that there is a range of treatments that can be recommended for many mental health issues, 
depending on clients' particular diagnostic, sociocultural, and psychological characteristics, 
although there are also many syndromes and disorders for which the effective treatments 
appear to be circumscribed. The wide range of issues that psychologists treat makes it difficult 
to generalize on this point, although, again, an examination of popular textbooks and other 
resources reveals substantial agreement with regard to many aspects of treatment planning. 
As is the case with assessment, however, one has limited latitude with regard to 
recommending treatments that are based on one's personal theoretical orientation rather than 
the client's BPS needs, circumstances, and preferences, along with what research evidence 
supports. As is the case with assessment, clinical expertise plays an important role when one is 
recommending treatments to any given client, but the obligation to approach treatment planning 
on the basis of an assessment of clients' needs and BPS circumstances, along with the 
evaluation of treatment risks, benefits, and alternatives, is very clear, as are the prohibitions 
against imposing one's theoretical or other biases on clients and against losing one's ability to 
remain reasonably objective throughout this process (APA, 2002; Beauchamp & Childress, 
2001). 
4. Mental health practitioners specialize. Clearly, practitioners have particular strengths, 
weaknesses, competencies, and preferences when it comes to their professional work, but their 
scope of practice is properly conceptualized as a specialization rather than a theoretical 
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orientation, as we have often viewed it. The argument here is that one must conceptualize 
cases from a BPS perspective if one's practice is going to be appropriately science based, 
although one is certainly free to specialize in working with particular types of treatments or 
populations. For example, because of prior education, supervised experience, preferences, and 
market forces, psychologists typically specialize in providing particular types of treatments with 
certain types of populations. If one typically works with adults with common Axis I and II issues 
and provides treatments that include popular evidence-based approaches, this might properly 
be conceptualized as adult general practice psychology. If, however, one offers only a particular 
type of therapy or works with only particular issues or populations, one's practice might best be 
viewed as a specialization. In many areas of professional psychology, definitions for different 
types of practices have been developed (for a listing of specialties and proficiencies currently 
recognized by the APA, see APA, 2006b). The definition of general practice psychology and its 
associated competencies has received less attention, however. I now turn to this and other 
implications that follow from the above propositions. 
 
Implications for Professional Psychology Practice, Education, and Research   
Because of the fundamentally complex BPS nature of human beings, there appears to 
be no scientifically supported alternative but to take a comprehensive, integrative approach to 
understanding human psychology. Any individual, a group of individuals, or the species as a 
whole cannot be fully understood without an integration of each of these perspectives. Using 
such an approach is conceptually very complex, and attempting to unify the field around a 
common conceptual framework would involve significant challenges to existing conventions. 
Nonetheless, we are obligated to consider adopting such an approach, because ours is a 
science-based profession. Below is an initial discussion of some of the challenges and benefits 
that would follow from adopting the above proposals. These issues often overlap across the 
categories of practice, education, and research, but these categories are useful for organizing 
the discussion. 
Practice 
As noted above, taking a BPS approach would not require changes in many of our 
current actual practices involving assessment, treatment planning, and intervention, because 
many of these practices are already based on a comprehensive, integrative, BPS, evidence-
based approach. Some of the language and frameworks used for conceptualizing psychological 
practice, however, would need to change. The language of theoretical orientations would 
generally be replaced by references to competencies and specializations, and the terms theory 
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and theoretical orientation would increasingly be used in their scientific sense rather than in the 
popular sense, which can refer to a hypothesis or even a conjecture. Students entering the field 
would learn that the theoretical orientation that will guide their practice involves a 
comprehensive, integrative approach that is squarely based on available scientific evidence and 
that neglecting to take this approach can result in incomplete case conceptualizations, 
misdiagnosed problems, and incomplete or ineffective treatment plans. Certainly, many 
practitioners would continue to specialize in providing particular types of treatments, but taking a 
BPS perspective would mean that they would not refer to their expertise with particular 
treatments as a theoretical orientation. 
Taking this approach would also push us away from practicing particular types of 
therapy and instead toward practicing psychology. I argue that practicing psychology requires a 
comprehensive, integrative perspective, whereas conducting one of the popular types of therapy 
(e.g., psychodynamic, cognitive, family systems, or eclectic therapy) involves the use of a 
particular framework that supports the implementation of that type of therapy. Therefore, one 
would use a cognitive–behavioral therapy framework to perform cognitive–behavioral therapy 
but not as the theoretical orientation with which to conduct a psychological assessment and 
develop a treatment plan. 
Many specialists, such as those practicing child psychology, health psychology, 
neuropsychology, or geropsychology, are already taking an explicitly comprehensive BPS 
approach that is fully integrative and often involves the participation of a multidisciplinary team. 
Consequently, we already have many models for how this is done (see also Sperry, 2001). 
Focusing on the practice of psychology (as opposed to therapies) is also inclusive of the types 
of practices that these and other psychologists already engage in and that sometimes involve 
little psychotherapy (Barlow, 2004). It is useful to remember as well that practicing psychology, 
as opposed to practicing therapies, is what our professional licenses actually permit us to do. 
Education 
Taking a science-based BPS approach to professional psychology education would 
require major changes in some areas but relatively minor changes in others. As noted above, 
training in psychological assessment procedures, for example, may require relatively little 
change. Other educational practices would evolve significantly, however. Emphasizing the 
practice of psychology rather than the theoretical orientation one uses to perform a particular 
therapy immediately raises questions about the type of practice involved. It then becomes 
necessary to address the definition of general practice psychology and its relation to the 
common specializations, several of which have already been officially delineated (APA, 2006b). 
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A definition of general practice psychology needs to be formulated before it is possible to 
identify the specific assessment, intervention, and other competencies that are necessary for 
students preparing to enter that type of practice. The APA accreditation standards currently 
require that accredited professional psychology graduate and internship training programs 
provide education that is “broad and general preparation for practice at the entry level” 
(Committee on Accreditation, 2005, p. 5). “Broad and general” practice, however, is not further 
defined. Doing so would have implications for the range of assessment procedures, treatments, 
and populations in which one should demonstrate competence to engage in general 
psychological practice. This would then have implications for the types of classroom, practicum, 
and internship training experiences that students would complete as well as for the nature and 
sequencing of any specialized training that they might also complete. 
The assessment and accreditation of educational programs in the United States in 
general has shifted to a competencies-based approach, as opposed to a core curriculum 
approach, over the last 15 years (Nichols & Nichols, 2001). This requires that sets of 
competencies be identified before the assessment or accreditation review can take place. 
Organizing professional psychology around the practice of therapies makes it quite difficult to 
develop standardized approaches for assessing readiness for internship or licensure, because 
someone could be fully competent at conducting cognitive therapy, for example, but 
incompetent with regard to the general practice of psychology if he or she is not competent with 
a BPS approach to assessment and treatment planning with some range of populations. (The 
extent to which the inverse is true, however, is less clear.) Identifying what the practice of 
psychology entails at the general practitioner and specialized levels is essentially prerequisite to 
establishing standardized approaches to assessing competence to practice psychology. Doing 
so would then have ramifications for internship and licensure application procedures, which 
could begin requiring formal, standardized assessments of the competencies needed for 
particular types of practice or at least endorsements by those who could take responsibility for 
judging these competencies. 
Emphasizing a BPS approach to professional psychology education might also result in 
stronger preparation in the scientific foundations of psychology than what is now typically 
required. Of course, changing curricula can be a very complex undertaking, but embracing a 
BPS approach might make it obvious that certain areas need to receive more attention than 
they often currently do for students to gain sufficient grounding in the biological, psychological, 
and sociocultural foundations of behavior. 
Research 
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Truly embracing a BPS approach to professional psychology would significantly increase 
practitioners' dependence on the scientific basis for their work. The often repeated criticism 
regarding the irrelevance of psychological science to practice will weaken as the breadth of the 
paradigmatic psychological knowledge we now have is more fully appreciated. Taking a BPS 
approach will also reduce the competition that has marked our history among the advocates of 
different schools, theories, and research methodologies and among those emphasizing 
biological, psychological, or social influences on behavior. If we are to take the next steps in the 
development of psychology as a science and a practice, it would be very helpful to bring 
together the various camps and schools around a shared conceptual framework, in part so that 
energies now spent on competition and partisanship instead can be invested in moving the field 
forward. For example, arguments between advocates of quantitative and qualitative research 
methodologies have become quite divisive for the field (Rychlak, 2005). When a comprehensive 
BPS approach is endorsed, however, it becomes difficult to argue that quantitative neuroscience 
“bench research” is irrelevant if it is focused on understanding important brain mechanisms. 
Likewise, it becomes difficult to criticize qualitative research involving, for example, 
ethnographies designed to uncover universal psychological attributes shared by humans across 
cultures. A more pluralistic appreciation for the full range of exploratory, correlational, and 
disconfirmatory research methodologies will develop when the commitment to understanding 
the complex, interrelated, BPS nature of human psychology is strengthened. 
In an evidence-based BPS approach to practice, one chooses the interventions that are 
most likely to be effective on the basis of the question at hand, not the interventions one 
happens to have been trained in or knows the best. Likewise, in an evidence-based BPS 
approach to science, one selects research methods on the same basis. Taking this approach 
will help orient the field toward problems and phenomena to be understood and away from 
camps devoted to researching particular topics using their preferred conceptualizations or 




 It is time for us to move away from the preparadigmatic era in professional psychology. 
That era truly was remarkably successful in terms of both science and practice, but current 
scientific evidence no longer supports choosing from a selection of theoretical orientations for 
guiding one's approach to psychological practice. The amount of widely accepted knowledge in 
the tremendously complex and young field of psychology was limited until recently, but this is no 
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longer the case, and there is now widespread agreement regarding the adequacy of 
explanations for many aspects of psychological development and functioning. 
Updating the basic frameworks that we use to conceptualize psychological practice is 
obviously a major and serious undertaking, but the continued development of the profession 
requires that our practice guidelines and educational curricula are scientifically current. Current 
scientific knowledge regarding human development and functioning clearly points to a 
comprehensive, integrative conceptual framework that can accommodate the highly complex 
and integrated BPS nature of human beings. The BPS approach, advocated by Engel (1977) 30 
years ago, has become widely known and accepted by the health care professions because it 
satisfies these requirements. Consequently, it is a good candidate for replacing the myriad 
theoretical orientations that have resulted in numerous contradictions and conflicts for 
professional psychology over the years. 
For those not already using a BPS framework in their practice, embracing this type of 
conceptual framework could be very challenging. The amount of work involved in developing 
new training and practice guidelines for implementing this type of approach is also daunting. 
Unifying psychologists around a common, science-based perspective, however, would have 
major benefits, among which is the potential to develop a much more unified voice for applying 
psychological research and practice to the extremely important mental health and social issues 
faced by societies around the world. Given that ours is a science-based profession, it appears 
that we cannot avoid the question of whether recent scientific progress requires that we now 
take these next steps in strengthening the scientific foundations of the profession. 
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Footnotes 
1 Social and sociocultural are used interchangeably in this article. The popular term 
biopsychosocial has obviously relied on the word social for the last 3 decades, although 
sociocultural is often preferred because of its emphasis on culture as a particularly important 
social factor. 
